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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
CHARLENE ANN HOLMES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880168-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
The Jurisdictional Statement, Statement of the Case and 
Statement of Facts are set forth in Appellant's opening brief at 
vii, 1-4. Appellant takes this opportunity to reply briefly to 
Points II and III in Respondent's Brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The initial detention of the vehicle in which Ms. Holmes 
was a passenger constituted a seizure of both Ms. Holmes and the 
driver, and the officers lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion 
upon which to permit such detention. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INITIAL STOP OF THE VEHICLE WAS A SEIZURE. 
(Reply to Point II of Respondent's Brief) 
The State contends in Point II of Respondent's Brief at 7 
that the initial stop of the vehicle did not constitute a seizure of 
Ms. Holmes. Such a contention is without merit. 
As Appellant pointed out in her opening brief at 7, both 
the Utah and United States Supreme Courts have held that the 
stopping of a vehicle and detention of its occupants is a seizure 
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. See State v. Cole, 674 
P.2d 119, 123 (Utah 1983); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 
(1979). The State confuses the issue by arguing that Prouse and 
Cole "speak of the stopping of the automobile and the detention of 
the occupant (emphasis in original)" and that the stopping of the 
vehicle alone does not therefore constitute a seizure. Respondent's 
Brief at 12. On the contrary, as this Court pointed out in State v. 
Baird, 94 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 41 (November 1, 1988), n[a]ny time a 
police officer stops an automobile the stop necessarily involves 
detention and therefore is a level two encounter requiring 
reasonable, articulable suspicion [citations omitted]." 
Furthermore, in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 
873, 881-82, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975) (cited by the 
State on page 13 of its brief), the United States Supreme Court 
stated: 
[W]e hold that when an officer's observations lead 
him reasonably to suspect that a particular 
vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in 
the country, he may stop the car briefly and 
investigate the circumstances that provoke 
suspicion. As in Terry, the stop and inquiry must 
be "reasonably related in scope to the 
justification for their initiation." 392 US, at 
29, 20 L Ed 2d 889, 88 S Ct 1868. The officer may 
question the driver and passengers about their 
citizenship and immigration status, and he may ask 
them to explain suspicious circumstances, but any 
further detention or search must be based on 
consent or probable cause. 
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This passage clarifies that the stopping of a vehicle necessarily 
involves the detention of its passengers and is therefore a seizure. 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), cited by the 
State in its brief at 8-9/ does not support the State's argument 
that the initial stop of Ms. Holmes was not a seizure. In Mimms, 
the officer lawfully stopped the vehicle based on the vehicle's 
expired license plates. The office therefore had a reasonable 
suspicion to justify the stop. The Mimms court pointed out: 
In this case, unlike Terry v. Ohio, there is no 
question about the propriety of the restrictions 
on respondent's freedom of movement. Respondent 
was driving an automobile with expired license 
tags in violation of the Pennsylvania Motor 
Vehicle Code. 
434 U.S. at 109. 
The Mimms court held that after a vehicle was lawfully 
stopped, an officer could ask the driver to step out of the vehicle 
in order to protect the officer's safety. The impact of Mimms was 
to allow officers who had legally stopped a car to ask the driver to 
step outside the car without needing to establish that the officer 
had a reasonable suspicion the driver was armed or might flee. The 
Mimms safety rationale for allowing an officer to ask a driver to 
step out of the car is simply inapplicable to this case where the 
initial stop or seizure of the vehicle and its occupants was not 
justified by a reasonable suspicion. 
While a few courts have extended the Mimms safety 
rationale to allow an officer to ask a passenger to step out of a# 
vehicle, in such cases, the legality of the initial stop of the 
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vehicle is not an issue; rather, the legality of ordering the 
passenger out of the car after making a legal stop of the vehicle is 
the issue. The decisions in such cases are generally based on a 
safety rationale and often involve facts suggesting the passenger 
might pose a threat to the officer's safety. See e.g. People v. 
Livigni, 88 A.D.2d 386, 453 N.Y.S.2d 708 (1982), aff'd, 58 N.Y.S.2d 
894, 460 N.Y.S.2d 530, 447 N.E.2d 1324 (1981), where the officer 
ordered the passenger out of the vehicle at gunpoint after observing 
an empty gun holster in plain view in the passenger compartment. 
State v. Ferrise, 269 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978), cited by 
the State on page 9 of its brief, is similarly inapplicable to the 
State's argument that no seizure occurred when the officers detained 
the vehicle and its occupants in the instant case. In Ferrise, the 
officers stopped the vehicle because it was proceeding the wrong way 
on a one-way street. The initial detention was therefore based on 
the constitutionally required reasonable suspicion, and the issue 
presented to the Ferrise court was whether opening the passenger 
door exceeded the scope of that detention. 
State v. Trujillo, 749 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987) is also 
inapplicable to a determination of whether a seizure occurred in the 
instant case since Trujillo did not involve the stopping of a 
vehicle. 
The State's effort to characterize the initial stop of 
the vehicle and its occupants as an incident that did not amount to 
a seizure and therefore is not entitled to fourth amendment 
protection is without foundation. The State's circular reasoning 
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that no seizure occurred until "after Lieutenant Gray saw defendant 
try to hide the roll of towels and then disclaim ownership of the 
towels" (Respondent's Brief at 12) and that "[b]y then, Lieutenant 
Gray had reasonable suspicion to retrieve the towels and unroll them 
based on defendant's actions" (Ij3. ) totally ignores the fact that 
the officers required a moving vehicle on a public road to pull to 
the side of the road, then immediately approached its occupants. A 
seizure of Ms. Holmes and the driver occurred when the officers 
stopped the vehicle in which Ms. Holmes was a passenger. To argue 
otherwise makes a mockery of the fourth amendment and confuses the 
issues presented in the instant case. 
POINT II 
THE OFFICERS LACKED A REASONABLE SUSPICION TO 
DETAIN MS. HOLMES. 
(Reply to Point III of Respondent's Brief) 
In Point I of her opening brief, Appellant discussed in 
detail her argument that the officers did not have a reasonable 
suspicion based on articulable facts to justify detaining her. 
Appellant takes this opportunity to reply briefly to some of the 
factual characterizations argued by the State. 
In the last paragraph on page 13 of its brief, the State 
lists three areas in support of a reasonable suspicion. While the 
experience of the officers must be given some deference, such 
experience alone is not enough to justify a detention. The 
reasonable suspicion standard would be meaningless if experienced 
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officers could simply say they were suspicious and therefore stopped 
an individual, without backing up that "suspicion" with articulable 
facts. 
While Officer Shelton did testify that he was familiar 
with the "normal scenario for prostitution in the area" (R. 39 at 
6), such familiarity is merely part of his experience and not an 
additional factor to be considered. Furthermore, the officer never 
outlined what the "normal scenario" is, and it is not clear how the 
facts in the instant case might fit within such "normal scenario." 
This "familiarity" adds nothing to the reasonable suspicion analysis. 
The State suggests that both officers saw Ms. Holmes 
walking slowly and "noted that her walking pace was consistent with 
prostitution." Respondent's Brief at 14. This suggestion is 
inaccurate. While Ms. Holmes' pace and manner of walking was one 
factor considered by Sergeant Shelton, Shelton's superior (R. 39 at 
4), Lieutenant Gray, observed "nothing unusual" about her walk 
(T. 35). This difference in interpretation by two trained officers, 
with the superior finding "nothing unusual" about the walk, 
emphasizes the subjective nature of this factor. The State's 
assertion that both officers considered the walk consistent with 
prostitution is incorrect, and a conclusion by one officer that 
Ms. Holmes walked like a prostitute adds little to the reasonable 
suspicion analysis. 
The State also mischaracterizes the driving pattern of 
the vehicle as evasive. Sergeant Shelton "conjectured" (T. 10) that 
the pair in the car had made a prostitution deal, then realized that 
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they were being followed (T. 10). However, as pointed out in 
Appellant's opening brief at 19, the officers were in an unmarked 
car and not in uniform; nothing in the record suggests either the 
driver or Ms. Holmes was aware of the officers prior to the 
detention. While the route taken by the driver might have seemed to 
be somewhat indirect, it did not establish an attempt to evade the 
officers. 
Finally, the State argues that the additional factors of 
trying to hide the towels and disclaiming ownership "increased the 
reasonable suspicion on the officer's part to detain defendant and 
check the towels." Respondent's Brief at 15. This ignores the 
obvious—Ms. Holmes had already been detained when the officer saw 
the towels. The officer was in a place he had no right to be as a 
result of illegally stopping the car in which Ms. Holmes was a 
passenger. The officer's viewing of the towels was not one of the 
items he listed to justify the detention and is not a factor to be 
considered in justifying the stop. 
The officers lacked a reasonable suspicion to justify the 
detention of Ms. Holmes, and the evidence seized from her must 
therefore be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, Ms. Holmes 
requests this Court to reverse the conviction and the trial court's 
ruling on the motion to suppress and remand this case to the trial 
court with an order to suppress the evidence and dismiss the charges 
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or provide for a new trial without such illegally seized evidence. 
Respectfully submitted this 'H" day of December, 1988. 
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